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Introduction 
In this essay I will argue that any plausible moral theory should be able to provide a good 
answer to the question “why should I be moral?” This is the question of moral motivation. I 
will further suggest that a contractarian moral theory, such as that of David Gauthier,1 
provides a plausible answer to this question. And that the ability to do this is due to the 
rational-choice framework of the contractarian theory. A moral theory that is able to provide 
an answer to the question of moral motivation is theoretically superior to other theories since 
it provides some foundations of morals.2 Anyone who wants to claim superiority of some 
other type of moral theory, a theory not grounded in rational-choice, will either have to deny 
the importance that I give to moral motivation and perhaps also deny the possibility of 
rational foundations in moral philosophy or show how their own theory gives an equally good 
answer to the question of moral motivation.  
The primary topic, and inspiration, for this essay is the contractarian moral theory of 
David Gauthier but the main ideas can be found as far back as in the writings of Plato3 and 
Epicurus4 and in full form in the writings of Thomas Hobbes5. It is important that we 
distinguish between two different types of theories referred to as “contractarian.” Peter 
Danielson calls these different types weak and strong contractarianism respectively.6 Weak 
contractarians, such as John Rawls, are working within morality; beginning with prior moral 
constraints and derive the principles of justice from there. Strong contractarians, such as 
Hobbes7 and Gauthier, on the other hand, argues from premises of non-moral individual 
rational choice. I hope it will become clear as we go along why contractarianism in its weak 
form has to abandon almost everything that makes contractariansim attractive in the first 
place. I am here then, like Gauthier, working within the strong tradition. 
First I will briefly say something about what I take to be our project and then what I 
take to be requirements of a reasonable moral theory. I will then argue that contractarianism 
lives up to these requirements and also that Gauthier’s theory, with some modifications 
perhaps, answers the question of moral motivation and gives a rational justification of 
                                                 
1 Proposed in his book Gauthier, D. (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford University Press 
2 Our approach is therefore foundationalist rather than coherentist. I assume that if foundationalism is possible it 
is superior to coherentism.  
3  The view presented by Glaucon in The Republic. Oxford University Press. 1998. 
4 Epicurus,”Letter to Menoeceus” in Cooper, D.E. (1998). Ethics – The Classic Readings. Blackwell Publishing  
5 Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. 1996. Oxford university press 
6 Danielson, P. (1992) Artificial Morality. Routledge. pp 25- 26  
7 It is also important to note the distinction between Hobbes moral theory and his political theory. Here we have 
only his moral contractarianism in mind. I think that Hobbes political theory is the wrong application of his 
moral theory. 
 4
morality. To show this we need some clarity about what “rationality” is and also what we 
mean by “motivation” and “justification”. We will explore some problematic aspects of the 
theory and an objection to the project of grounding morality in rational choice known as “the 
relevance objection”.  
We will not, however, discuss the particular content8of a rational morality except 
where prior knowledge of this is required for our arguments. We will also not discuss the 
rationality of keeping agreements9 and we will not defend the theories of value that are 
implicit in the theory of rational choice.10 We will instead concentrate on the framework of 
morality and that is, if we are right, the framework of rational choice. Our main arguments 
are from the perspective of moral motivation.  
I follow Gauthier in that a plausible moral theory should be able to reach normative 
conclusions without introducing prior moral assumptions. He writes ”If the reader is tempted 
to object to some part of this view, on the ground that his moral intuitions are violated, then 
he should ask what weight such an objection can have, if morality is to fit within the domain 
of rational choice. We should emphasize the radical difference between our approach [...] 
from that of moral coherentists and defenders of “reflective equilibrium”, who allow initial 
weight to our considered moral judgements” 11 Here then, we allow no such initial weight. 
The main problem with appealing to moral intuitions in theory is that when intuitions conflict 
we have no further tools for reaching reasoned agreement. My theoretical intuitions tell me 
that it would surely be better if we could build a theory without appealing to any moral 
intuitions. 
Our project 
So if our project is to show that a good moral theory should be able to answer the question 
“why be moral?” we need to consider what kind of answer to this question would be 
satisfactory. We will call the person asking this question “the moral sceptic” despite the 
negative connotations that this brings. The sceptic is, as we see her here, neither an anti-social 
being nor an egoist. She is rather a fully rational person asking for reasons to do what 
                                                 
8 In Gauthier’s case this is the principle of minimax relative concession (see Gauthier. (1986). chapter V. “Co-
operation: Bargaining and Justice”, pp 113- 156) and the Lockean proviso (see ibid, chapter VII. “The initial 
bargaining position: Rights and the Proviso”, pp 190- 232) 
9 Known as the “compliance problem” (see ibid, chapter VI. “Compliance: Maximization Constrained”, pp 157- 
190) 
10 Gauthier claims that value-subjectivism and value-relativism are implicit in the theory of rational choice. He 
points to Gilbert Harman and John L. Mackie for a detailed defence of these value- theoretical positions. He 
follows Harman and finds objective value explanatory redundant. ibid, pp 55- 59 
11 ibid, p 269 
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morality requires. What kind of answer is the moral sceptic looking for then? To answer this 
we first need to distinguish between four different questions in moral philosophy, all with 
their own importance and appeal. 
 
a.) What is morality 
b.) Why do people act morally? 
c.) Why should we act morally? 
d.) What is/are the fundamental principles of morals? 
 
I think that the sceptic is primarily interested in question C. So defending the possibility and 
importance of answering C is our main task here. (But in arguing for this we must, however, 
say quite a lot about A as well.) Evolutionary theories of morals seem to be focusing on 
question B. T.M. Scanlon on his account of moral motivation seems also to be interested 
primarily in question B. Scanlon writes “I myself accept contractualism largely because the 
account it offers of moral motivation is phenomenologically more accurate then any other I 
know of” 12 I will not dispute his claim here since we are not primarily concerned with what is 
“phenomenologically accurate” or, for that matter, evolutionary accurate. These other 
perspectives are very interesting in their own right but they do not help us much in answering 
the question of why we should be moral. 
The person asking “Why?” is looking for a justification of morality. But what kind of 
justification and how are we to achieve one? Appealing to people’s moral intuitions, like e.g. 
theorists of reflective equilibrium do, would not help us out here. That would be like 
answering: “most people don’t think so!” and I don’t think this would convince the sceptic. 
To appeal to intuitions in this way is to appeal to some facts. What about some other kinds of 
facts then? What if we could find the true morality or some “moral facts”? This would be an 
attempt to provide an epistemic justification of morality. Still, I think that the sceptic would be 
unmoved by our attempts. It would still be open for him or her to say “so what?” The sceptic 
is, I think, not asking us to point to some observational facts or some wrong-making 
“properties” (natural or non-natural). What we are looking for then is not an epistemic 
justification. The sceptic is rather asking for a prudential justification of morality. Providing 
such a thing would be to appeal to something to which the individual is already committed 
and show how these ends could be promoted by adhering to morality. Much of the remainder 
                                                 
12 Scanlon. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 
p 187 
 6
of the essay will be about if and how this is possible. But we need first to consider why we at 
all would like to show this. 
Why moral motivation is important 
Many have explicitly denied the importance of our project, T.M. Scanlon for example says 
that it would be “misleading to say that we are looking for a way of justifying the morality of 
right and wrong to someone who does not care about it – an “amoralist” – because this 
suggests that what we are looking for is an argument that begins from something to which 
such a person must be already committed and shows that anyone who accepts this starting 
point must recognize the authority of the morality of right and wrong.” 13 We on the other 
hand are looking for a way of justifying morality and we are looking for an argument that 
begins from something to which a person must already be committed. But is this kind of 
motivation really important?  
To answer this question we need to consider what morality is for. Is morality 
something that is “from above” and completely separate from the interests of human beings or 
has morality got something to do with our interests? What we mean by “interest” will 
hopefully become clear in our discussion of “rationality” below. But it is not hard to imagine 
that people have different interests and sometimes other people’s interests come into conflict 
with our own. If these kinds of conflicts appear frequently we need a rule. The point of 
morality then is to solve conflicts of interest. Kurt Baier writes “if the point of view of 
morality were that of self-interest, then there could never be moral solutions of conflicts of 
interest. However, when there are conflicts of interest, we always look for a “higher” point of 
view. . . . by ‘the moral point of view’ we mean a point of view which is a court of appeal for 
conflicts of interest” 14 The idea is that both parties to the conflict would be worse off without 
such rules. Without moral rules we could only resort to violence and we will end up in the 
Hobbesian war of “every man, against every man” 15 and this would obviously be 
disadvantageous to all. Therefore all has an interest in having moral rules.  
The assumption that morality is connected to our interests in some way or another, 
exactly how will be considered next, and the assumption that morality is needed to solve 
conflicts of interest among people are in my opinion very plausible ones. I think that these 
assumptions should be acceptable not only to contractarians but to most moral theorists and to 
                                                 
13 ibid, p 148 
14 Baier, K. (1958). The Moral Point of View. Cornell University Press. p 190 
15 Hobbes. (1651). p 84 
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ordinary people as well for that matter. We agree then with Jan Narveson when he says “a set 
of moral rules that those addressed have, simply, no possible interest in accepting, is a non-
starter, a nonsense morality.” 16 
Reasons and motivation 
We must also point out what we mean by “motivation” What we are looking for is something 
that can possibly be motivationally efficacious for each individual. What we are looking for 
are reasons to be moral, reasons that every rational person must accept. The person asking for 
such a reason is, I believe, asking for a “sound deliberative route” from her own “subjective 
motivational set.” Borrowing these terms from Bernard Williams17, what she is asking for are 
“internal reasons.” For a person then, according to Williams, to have an (internal) reason for 
action is for that person to be able to start from something from which she already has some 
kind of motivation and through deliberative reasoning reach the conclusion that she has the 
reason in question. And this “something” to which we have to appeal cannot be something 
external (such as a divine authority or a “moral reality”). It must be a resource within each 
person. Williams concludes that there are no external reasons for action. 
One could argue against this saying that is counter-intuitive that a man who treats his 
wife badly has no reason to treat her differently if there is nothing in his subjective 
motivational set that would be served by changing his ways18. There certainly is something 
counter-intuitive about this peculiar situation, but I think that the “counter-intuitiveness” 
stems from the fact that it is unrealistic that there is nothing in the man’s motivational set that 
would be served by changing his behaviour towards the wife. The wife certainly has reason to 
leave him anyway, and perhaps even to call the police if it’s a serious matter, if the man 
wouldn’t want that he certainly has an internal reason to chance his ways.  
I think this intuitive argument against reasons internalism is without merit. But what 
if we were persuaded by it? This would commit us to some difficult tasks. We would have to 
be able to explain the ontological status of external reasons; if reasons exist regardless of 
one’s beliefs, desires and interests, then where do they come from? And we would also need 
to explain how we can get knowledge about these reasons. And further, and most importantly, 
explain how these reasons motivate us to action. If the externalist wants to show us how this 
is possible then he is committed to the view that facts could contain within themselves some 
                                                 
16 Narveson, J. (2003) “The Contractarian Theory of Morals: FAQ.” Aufklärung und kritik, Sonderheft 7/2003 
17 Williams, B. (1981) “Internal and External Reasons” in Moral Luck. Cambridge University Press  
18 Scanlon. (1998). pp 366- 367 
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kind of “normative authority”. That is, that facts can be reason-giving (and motivating) all by 
themselves. Many attempts have been made to explain these things19 and to refute them all 
would need another essay! Some of these attempts have included the idea that there are moral 
“properties” present in some actions and not in others and that we can observe these 
properties (perhaps with a special faculty) and that these observations can guide our actions. 
Or that some moral facts are just “self-evident.”20 What all this really amounts to is 
intuitionism about reasons and we have already expressed our worries about appealing to 
intuitions in moral theory. It is really difficult to say something about this without making a 
straw man out of our opponent. However, I think that we have established that the burden of 
proof lies on the reasons externalist and we follow Williams in that there are only internal 
reasons for action. We continue now with our positive account of finding (internal) reasons to 
be moral. 
Deriving morality from rationality 
All reasons to act are obviously not moral reasons. But we propose that moral reasons cannot 
be of a totally separate nature than all other reasons.21 Moral reasons are simply “reasons” 
grounded in rationality and they motivate us in the same way that all other reasons do. There 
are, however important differences as hopefully will become clear below. For now it is 
enough to point out that these important differences are not, and cannot be, that moral reasons 
are something completely separate from other reasons. They are not “non-natural” or 
transcendental as some have claimed. Gauthier writes “A person [...] considers what he can 
do, but initially draws no distinction between what he may and may not do” He then asks 
“How then does he come to acknowledge this distinction? How does a person come to 
recognize a moral dimension to choice?” 22 We will return to this question below in our 
discussion of the relevance objection. We will argue that moral reasons must be reasons of 
rational- choice.  
But why not just assume, like David Hume, that morality stems from our fellow-
feelings and sympathy for one another or that our moral motivation is grounded in 
“sociability.” Gauthier writes: 
 
                                                 
19 See for example Shafer- Landau, R. (2003). Moral Realism. Oxford University Press. and Scanlon. (1998). 
20 Shafer- Landau. (2003). pp 247- 250 
21 Narveson, J. (1988). The Libertarian Idea. 2001. Broadview Press. p 126 
22 Gauthier. (1988). p 9 
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“One is not [...] able to escape morality by professing a lack of moral feeling or concern, or a 
lack of some other particular interest or attitude, because morality assumes no such affective 
basis. Hume believed the source of morality to lie in sympathetic transmission of our feelings 
from one person to another. But Kant, rightly, insisted that morality cannot depend on such 
particular psychological phenomena, however benevolent and humane their effect, and 
however universally they may be found”23  
 
The argument here is from motivation. If morality is grounded on sympathy, we can not 
convince a person who lacks the particular feelings required to act morally. Moreover, 
different people have different feelings and attitudes as well as differently strong ones. We 
need to say two things about this, first that neither sociability nor “fellow-feeling” are the 
foundations of morals, and second that even though they are not the foundations these things 
are certainly not incompatible with Gauthier’s account of morality. Living “in unity with our 
fellows” is certainly an important feature of human life for most of us but it is not the basis of 
moral rights and duties. “Unity” and sociability are, so to say only a bonus feature of morality 
and not its foundation. Gauthier writes: 
 
“The contractarian need not claim that actual persons take no interest in their fellows; indeed, 
we suppose that some degree of sociability is characteristic of human beings. But the 
contractarian sees sociability as enriching human life; for him, it becomes a source of 
exploitation if it induces persons to acquiesce in institutions and practices that but for their-
feelings would be costly to them. Feminist thought have surely made this, perhaps the core 
form of human exploitation, clear to us. Thus the contractarian insists that a society could not 
command the willing allegiance of a rational person if, without appealing to her feelings for 
others, it afforded her no expectation of net benefit”24 
 
As noted above we want to argue for the importance of being able to answer the moral 
sceptic. Is it then possible to ground moral duties on something as instable as sympathy? We 
conclude, like Gauthier that it isn’t; we must find something more stable and continuous. And 
since not everybody are “believers” in the same God, the general happiness, objective value 
or share the same moral intuitions, appealing to such things won’t get us the result we want. 
So shortly, Kant was right about that morality must have something to do with reason. He 
                                                 
23 ibid, p 103 
24 ibid, p 11 
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was only wrong about what reason is. Below we will take a look at different conceptions of 
rationality.  
Rationality and moral motivation 
So if we want to ground morality in rationality one promising strategy would be to find 
premises that the “moral sceptic” must accept, and then show that certain moral statements 
follow from those premises. In Gauthier’s case the premises are not factual statements, or 
definitions of moral terms, but rather principles of individual rationality. And since Gauthier, 
as we will see below, identify rationality with individual utility-maximization the question 
“why be rational?” hardly makes any sense. Jan Narveson writes “The “shouldness” of what 
is reasonable is not an accident, and not simply an additional factor pointing in favor of a 
given choice. That we should “follow reason” is true just because that’s what reason talk is 
all about: what we should do and what reason tells us to do are not two different things” 25 If 
then, the “should” of moral principles are not very different from the “should” of other non-
moral rational principles that is, if these principles cannot be rejected and if moral principles 
can be shown to follow from them, then morality will have been provided with a suitable 
foundation. The moral sceptic will be hard put to reject such principles.  
What is rationality? 
We have already been talking a lot about “rationality” but what exactly is rationality? 
Gauthier makes an important distinction between two different conceptions of rationality, the 
universalistic and the maximizing conception. Gauthier identifies rationality with individual 
utility- maximization. Choosing rationally is to select the action that yields the outcome with 
greatest expected utility. And utility is a measure of individual preferences. This is the 
maximizing conception of rationality. Gauthier here follows David Hume in his often quoted: 
“Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” 26   
The universalistic conception, deriving from Kant and used by R.M Hare27 among 
others, on the other hand is committed to the view that what makes it rational to satisfy an 
interest is independent of whose interest is it. The universalistically rational person thus seeks 
to satisfy all interests.28 It is important to notice that the universalistic conception of reason 
already includes the moral dimension of impartiality that Gauthier seeks to generate. 
                                                 
25 Narveson. (1988). p 126 
26 Hume, D. (1739) A Treatise of Human Nature, ii. iii. iii. 2003. Dover philosophical classics. p 295 
27 See Hare, R.M. (1981) Moral Thinking. Oxford University Press 
28 Gauthier. (1986). p 7 
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Connecting morality with rationality is therefore easily accomplished by proponents of the 
universalistic conception of practical reason.29 Gauthier argues that the maximizing 
conception is almost universally accepted in the social sciences, economic-, decision- and in 
game theory. Therefore the onus of proof falls on those who defend universalistic 
rationality.30  
My main argument against universalistic rationality is, again, that it runs into trouble 
with moral motivation. Gauthier writes “on the universalistic conception all persons have in 
effect the same basis for rational choice – the interests of all – and this assumption, of the 
impersonality or impartiality of reason, demands defence” 31 The question “why should I 
promote the interests of all?” seems to me to need an answer - while the question “why should 
I promote my own interests?” does not (and can perhaps not even be given a meaningful 
answer). Individual interest provides the basis for rational choice. 
Here it is very important to point out what we mean by “interest” or “self- interest.” 
On this point of the theory misunderstandings are very common. When we say “self- interest” 
we do not mean interests in the self but interests of the self, interests held by oneself as 
subject.32 So our conception of rationality surely has nothing to do with egoism. Perhaps it is 
better to talk of “self-perceived- interest”33 rather than “self- interest.” We cannot, I think, 
have something like “purely selfless interests” for the interests we have must be ours to the 
extent that we are proper agents with motives. And these motives can, but must not, include 
altruistic ones. I think this is very plausible because it seems to me altogether unintelligible 
that things other than individual people can have interests. Inanimate objects and groups of 
people cannot have interests.  
It is also important to point out that (even though our theory speaks of conditions for 
coherent and considered preference as conditions for rational preference) we do not address 
the content of the particular preference. We are not concerned with the ends of action; we 
leave that to the individual’s preferences. The theory of rational choice treats practical reason 
as strictly instrumental.34 Again we are in agreement with David Hume when he writes that it 
is “not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my 
finger.” 35  
                                                 
29 See for example Kant and Hare 
30 Gauthier. (1986). p 8 
31 ibid, p 8 
32 ibid, p 7 
33 Lester, J. (2000). Escape from Leviathan. Macmillan Press. p 37 
34 Gauthier. (1986). p 25 
35 Hume. (1739). ii. iii. iii. p 296 
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The structure of contractariansim 
A common objection to the idea of a rational morality is that it is very often advantageous to 
comply with the present moral in ones society even when this code differs from what we 
usually consider to be moral. Must we therefore say that the present moral code is rational? If 
we were to go along with this, contractarianism would lose much of its appeal.  This objection 
is, however based on an equally common misunderstanding. The misunderstanding consists in 
the failure to recognize that we have rationality operating on two different levels here. The 
first is that we want principles that are rational and the second is that it should be rational to 
comply with these principles. Most agree that it would be rational to agree on certain rational 
moral principles. The problem is that it would often be rational to defect, that is fail to carry 
out that what was agreed. This is known as the compliance problem and this problem is 
subject to much dispute and much has been written about it. Gauthier claims to have an 
answer to it. We will not discuss his particular answer here but we stress the importance of 
distinguishing between the two “levels” of rational choice. 
This two-level structure was already recognized by Hobbes in his “laws of nature”. 
These “laws”, he imagines, are precepts of individual rationality, “found out by reason”.36 
Hobbes imagines a pre-social, pre-moral state known as the “state of nature”. We certainly 
don’t need to say that the state of nature really has existed. It is often a very good way of 
understanding why we have something by imagining that we didn’t have it. So if we want to 
know why we have morality, or why we want morality, it is a good way to imagine how it 
would be without morality.  
In the state of nature there are no moral rules whatsoever, each person has the 
unlimited right to do whatever he can to preserve himself, but there are no obligations towards 
others, “every man has the right to every thing; even to one another’s body. And therefore, as 
long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any 
man, (how strong or wise soever he be)...” The word “right” here is confusing; perhaps it 
would be better to speak of an unlimited freedom. The idea is that rationality directs us to 
leave this horrible state. The fundamental law of nature tells us to seek peace and follow it 
where ever it may be found, and when it may not, by right of nature, to defend ourselves by 
all the means we can.37 The second law, which Hobbes takes to be derivable from the first is 
that a man be willing, when others are so too, for the sake of peace, to lay down his right of 
nature (his freedom) to do all things “and be contented with so much liberty against other 
                                                 
36 Hobbes. (1651). p 86 
37 ibid, p 87 
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men, as he would allow other men against himself.” 38 Hobbes argues that as long as men do 
not lay down their right to all things, all men are in the condition of war. But if others did not 
lay down their right it would be “no reason for any one, to divest himself of his: for that were 
to expose himself to pray […] rather than to dispose himself for peace.” 39 
It is in the introduction of the third law that things starts to become difficult. Even if 
it is advantageous to make agreements, or covenants, it does not follow that it is advantageous 
to keep these agreements. Hobbes himself, of course, recognized this and introduces therefore 
the third law that is “that men perform their covenants made […] And in this law of nature” 
he continues “consisteth the fountain an original of JUSTICE.” 40 The problem is that even if 
each individual maximizes her expected utility in making an agreement she does not (always) 
maximize her expected utility in complying with this agreement. This opens for the objection 
of “the Foole.” The Foole accepts the first two laws of nature, but questions the third. The 
Foole asks whether “reason, which dictateth to every man his own good” 41 could not 
sometimes call for non-compliance. He questions why one should keep one’s covenants in 
situations where it would be advantageous to break them. Gauthier says “The Foole 
challenges the heart of the connection between reason and morals that both Hobbes and we 
seek to establish – the rationality of accepting a moral constraint on the direct pursuit of 
one’s greatest utility.” 42 As we will see, Hobbes and Gauthier solve this problem rather 
differently however. 
Prisoner’s dilemma 
Let’s take a practical example.43 If I have an apple and you have a banana and I would rather 
have your banana and you would rather have my apple. A trade seems convenient. But most 
of all both you and I want to have both the apple and the banana. The best possible outcome 
for me (I get to have both fruits) would be the worst possible outcome for you (You having 
none of the fruits.) And so the best for you would be the worst for me. The second-best 
outcome would be the trade (I get your banana and you get my apple) and the second- worst 
outcome would be the status-quo (I get to keep my apple even though I would rather have 
                                                 
38 ibid 
39 ibid 
40 ibid, p 95 
41 ibid, p 96 
42 Gauthier. (1986). p 161 
43 A similar example can be found in Narveson. (1988). p 137- 138 (He speaks of fry pans and dollars where I 
speak of apples and bananas)  
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your banana and you get to keep your banana even though you would rather have my apple) 
This kind of situation can be depicted as a so called “prisoner’s dilemma.” 44 
The dilemma is then whether I should choose the co-operative strategy (go along 
with the trade) or if I should choose the non-co-operative strategy. If the other person chooses 
to co-operate (letting me have the banana) I could either co-operate too (giving away my 
apple) or choose the non-co-operative strategy. The first option will bring us the second-best 
outcome and the latter option will bring my best outcome and hence the other person’s worst. 
The other person, of course, reasons in the same way. The “traditional” “solution” to the 
dilemma is that the rational strategy is the non-co-operative since regardless of what the other 
person chooses this strategy will have me better off.  
Hobbes’s solution involves the notion of a “sovereign.” (I.e. I get arrested if I run 
away with your banana without giving you my apple) This feature makes Hobbes’s solution a 
political one rather than a moral one. In fact the political solution makes morality 
unnecessary.45 There are further problems with the sovereign however. Sovereigns are costly! 
Gauthier says “those subject to the Hobbesian sovereign do not, in fact, attain an optimal 
outcome; each pays a portion of the costs needed to enforce adherence to agreements, and 
these costs render the outcome sub-optimal.” 46 Gauthier also says that if the free market acts 
as an invisible hand, the sovereign acts as a very “visible foot”, “directing, by well-placed 
kicks, the efforts of each to the same social end.” 47 
Gauthier has a different solution. As I see it, Gauthier’s reasoning starts with a 
presumption that there must be something awkward with what we called the traditional 
solution to the prisoner’s dilemma. If rationality consists in maximizing one’s utility it seems 
really strange that rational persons none the less fail to bring about the co-operative outcome 
that would be better for both. Instead of “defecting” in prisoner’s dilemma-games, Gauthier 
thinks that the rational person adopts a disposition to co-operate. His solution involves seeing 
the rationality of dispositions to choose rather than rationality of individual choices. 
Gauthier’s argument identifies practical rationality with utility-maximization at the level of 
dispositions to choose.48 This is also what we need to say to the Foole. Remember the person 
questioning Hobbes third law of nature, that of compliance. We need to say to him that it is 
rational to perform one’s covenant even when such performance is not directly to one’s 
                                                 
44 A more detailed explanation of the dilemma can be found in Gauthier. (1986). p 79- 82 
45 ibid, p 163- 164 
46 ibid, p 164 
47 ibid, p 163 
48 ibid, p 187 
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benefit. Given that the disposition to perform is to one’s benefit. We must also say that the 
disposition to decide whether or not to comply with one’s rationally made agreements by 
appealing directly to utility-maximization is itself disadvantageous because it excludes one 
from participating in highly beneficial co-operative arrangements. The disposition to keep 
one’s agreements on the other hand makes one an eligible partner in beneficial co-operation, 
and so it is itself advantageous. That is, gives than one’s disposition can be known, or 
sufficiently suspected. 
This has all been quite sketchy and I do not intend to give the complete picture. 
Gauthier’s solution is neither uncomplicated nor uncontroversial. We will not, however, 
further discuss the numerous objections to it here. Much has been written about this49 and I 
really have nothing to add to those discussions. We will instead move on to consider an 
objection to our project for which we are now ready.  
The relevance objection 
Gauthier’s project is in considerable part to derive morality from rationality, which is deriving 
morality from non-moral premises, as we have seen; this (if it is successful) has several 
theoretical advantages. Gauthier himself describes his project thus: 
 
“...we shall exemplify normative theory by sketching the theory of rational choice. Indeed we 
shall do more. We shall develop a theory of morals as part of the theory of rational choice. 
We shall argue that the rational principles for making choices, or decisions among possible 
actions, include some that constrain the actor pursuing his own interest in an impartial way. 
These we identify as moral principles”50 
 
  Objections have been raised against this identification, however, and this is the 
“relevance objection”. David Copp describes the objection thus:  
 
“The issue here is not a verbal one, nor is it purely technical. It is whether the contractarian 
has anything to say to the sceptic about the rational credentials of morality; it is whether the 
topic is still morality. Perhaps Gauthier’s argument succeeds in justifying certain 
                                                 
49 see Sayre-McCord, G. (1991). “Deception and Reasons to be Moral” and Copp, D. (1991). “Contractarianism 
and Moral Scepticism” and Smith, H. (1991). “Deriving Morality from Rationality” and Danielson, P. (1991). 
“Closing the Compliance Dilemma: How it’s Rational to be Moral in a Lamarckian World” all in Vallentyne, P. 
(Ed). Contractarianism and Rational Choice. 1991. Cambridge University Press 
50 Gauthier. (1986). p 2 
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requirements of rational choice, such as to maximize their opportunities for making 
advantageous agreements. Yet he still needs to show that these are moral requirements. This 
is the relevance objection”51 
 
This is a serious objection to the contractarian project. What is under attack here is 
not Gauthier’s conclusions (they may, or may not, be correct) but the object and the starting 
premises of his whole project, basically the idea of a rational morality and the idea of 
developing a moral theory within the framework of rational choice. We assume now that 
Gauthier has shown that it is rational both to adopt constrained maximization in many cases 
and then to carry it out. Would the success of this argument show, as Gauthier believes it 
does, that morality is founded on rationality, and hence that rationality provides a justificatory 
framework for moral behaviour and principles? Holly Smith argues that “if the success of 
Gauthier’s argument would provide a rational justification for morality, then we would be 
well repaid to tinker with the details of his argument in an attempt to salvage it from my 
previous criticisms. But if success would not provide such a justification, then such tinkering 
has little or no point” 52 We agree with Smith that if success in Gauthier’s argument would 
still not provide a justification of morality, then tinkering with the details of the arguments 
would, indeed, have little or no point. But we will instead argue that success in Gauthier’s 
argument would provide a justification of morality and we will try to show that (some of the) 
the arguments Smith and Copp offer are mistaken. Smith puts the relevance objection slightly 
different: 
 
“We may characterize what Gauthier has done as arguing that individual rationality, or self-
interest, requires a person to dispose herself to perform certain cooperative acts, and then 
actually to perform those acts when the time comes. Suppose we assume that the acts in 
question are precisely the same ones as morality requires. Still, the success of this argument 
would not show that morality has been provided with a justification. It would show that we 
have self-interested reasons to do what morality, if it were true (or correct), would demand – 
but it would not show that morality is true (or correct). Such an argument would merely show 
an interesting coincidence between the purported claims of morality and the real claims of 
self-interest” 53 
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Smith seems to presuppose that there are something like “the purported claims of 
morality” that are separate from “the real claims of self-interest” This needs, I believe, 
defence and here we simply deny the existence of such separate claims and stick with the real 
claims of each individuals reason. There are only internal reasons, remember. As we argued 
above there is no fundamental difference between moral reasons and other kinds of reasons in 
the respect that they are both grounded in rationality. But there are however important 
differences between them and a large part of the remainder of this essay will be about 
pointing them out and defending them. David Copp writes “In order to answer the relevance 
objection, one would need a theory as to the nature of moral codes. Gauthier does not have 
such a theory...” 54 In answering the relevance objection, then, we will sketch such a theory. 
What is morality? 
All rational principles are clearly not moral principles. There has to be something more there 
to make a principle a moral principle. But precisely what? Gauthier claims that the traditional 
conception of morality identifies any impartial constraint on self-interested behaviour as 
moral. Holly Smith argues that impartial constraint is not sufficient to show that a principle is 
moral. She writes: “Consider a rule of etiquette requiring thank-you notes to be handwritten 
rather than typed. Such a rule is certainly an impartial constraint, but it does not thereby 
qualify as a moral principle” 55 She then argues that what is lacking in this principle is 
“something like appropriate deontic force” 56 She suggests these three (additional) criteria for 
moral principles to qualify as moral principles: 
 
a.) They must be overriding 
b.) They must be categorical 
c.) They must support attitudes of guilt and blame 
 
In a footnote Smith suggests a fourth criterion; that of “appropriate content” she argues: 
 
“Another example is the principle of malevolence, which prescribes any action maximizing 
the general unhappiness. This principle is both impartial and a constraint on self-interest 
                                                 
54 Copp. (1991). p 208 
55 Smith. (1991). p 251 
56 ibid 
 18
(since it is often highly damaging to an agent’s own interests to follow it), yet it hardly seems 
to be a moral principle. Other examples are supplied by club rules, legal codes, mafia codes of 
honour, professional codes, administrative regulations, etc. Of course, some of the 
prescriptions stemming from these sources will require acts that are morally right, but it does 
not follow that all such prescriptions coincide with morality, or that any of them in itself 
constitutes a moral prescription. The difficulty with the principle of malevolence is not the 
one I cite in the text – inappropriate deontic force – but rather inappropriate content”57 
 
This criterion of “appropriate content”, however, we will have to reject. The 
principle of malevolence may be both impartial and a constraint on self-interest but it will 
hardly pass the test as a rational principle as Smith herself points out. So this principle then 
constitutes no objection to Gauthier’s account of moral principles. I think, on the other hand, 
that is very reasonable indeed to think of morality as analogous to club rules or legal codes. 
“Mafia codes of honour” on the other hand are seldom both rational and impartial.  
Smith then asks “whether Principle 2 [principle 2: If the agent rationally forms the 
intention to cooperate, then it is rational for her to carry out this intention (assuming she has 
acquired no new information and has not altered her values)] has the kind of deontic force 
required of genuine moral principles. Is its recommendation overriding and categorical, and 
does it support attitudes of guilt and blame, etc.?” 58 This we will try to show. We will deal 
with all her suggested criteria.  
How contractarian principles are overriding and categorical 
Even though we argue that the interests of men are the foundations of morals, morality have 
to be able to override individual interest. Why? Gauthier quotes Hume’s question of “what 
theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show that all the duties it 
recommends are also the true interest of each individual” and concludes that Hume seems to 
be mistaken because “such a theory would be too useful. Were duty no more than interest, 
morals would be superfluous” 59 But he also says that Hume’s mistake in insisting that moral 
duties must be the true interest of each individual conceals a fundamental insight. “Practical 
reason is linked to interest, or, as we shall come to say, to individual utility, and rational 
                                                 
57 ibid 
58 ibid, p 252 (By “Principle 2” she means the second of two principles that are implicit in Gauthier’s theory. 
They are: (1.) under circumstances C, it is rational for an agent to adopt constrained maximization and form the 
intention to cooperate. (2.) If the agent rationally forms the intention to cooperate, then it is rational for her to 
carry out this intention (assuming she has acquired no new information and has not altered her values).  
59 Gauthier, (1986). p 1 
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constraints on the pursuit of interest have themselves a foundation in the interests they 
constrain” 60 This may seem as we are trying to catch the best of two worlds – and perhaps -
we are! Remember Gauthier’s answer to the Foole above. We shifted our focus from the 
rationality of particular actions to dispositions to choose. Even if our disposition forces us to 
make disadvantageous choices, the disposition itself is advantageous. The idea of a moral 
disposition somehow involves the idea of “overridingness.” The moral disposition requires of 
an agent the she is able to let moral principles take precedence over other rational principles. 
Holly Smith seems to agree that contractarian principles can be both overriding and 
categorical – in one sense. She writes “They are overriding because they always outweigh the 
recommendations of self-interest to maximize one’s own utility, and they are categorical for 
the same reason: they tell the agent what to do regardless of her desires at the moment of 
action.” But she continues “On the other hand, there is a sense in which they are neither 
overriding nor categorical, since these prescriptions only arise because of the agent’s prior 
attempts to satisfy her desires and maximize her self-interest by adopting constrained 
maximization. This is not the kind of independence from desires that Kant, for example, had in 
mind” 61 Gauthier would surely agree with this which is indicated by this quote “The Kantian 
ideal of a pure reason which is practical despite its utter indifference to passion is entirely 
foreign to our argument. The imperatives of reason remain assertoric. And they remain 
imperatives of individual reason.” 62 So we thereby avoid all resort to something 
“trancendental” which I consider a great theoretical advantage. It would be question begging 
to require the principles to be categorical in the stronger Kantian sense. 
I think we have answered Smith’s challenge to show that contractarian principles can 
be overriding and sufficiently “categorical” but we can do more than that! The contractarian 
doesn’t just assume that moral principles “must be” overriding and categorical. We can even 
give independent reasons why they must be so. As we argued above it is very reasonable to 
consider morality to be a tool to resolve conflicts of interest. Morality overrides “inclination” 
in the sense that it is intended to settle conflicts of interest, which it could not do if it couldn’t 
overrule one or the other or both parties. But it doesn’t, as Narveson writes, “override 
“inclination” in any sense that envisages a contrast between mere “sensuous” motives and 
any others one could imagine” He continues “The trancendental aspirations of rival religious 
groups, or for that matter rival metaphysicians, can give rise to wars or other disputes that 
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require conflict resolution just as much as any more “sensuous” motives. Indeed, quite a lot 
more if history is our guide: really major fracases, such as the world wars, the Napoleonic 
ones, the Thirty Years’ War, and so on, are invariably fought with strong ideological 
motivation.”63 We conclude that principles generated by “morals by agreement” not only can 
be overriding and sufficiently categorical. We have also an explanation to why they must be 
so. If morality was unable to override self-interest it would not fill the desired function. 
Morality would be useless if it was unable to override individual advantage. 
How a contractarian morality support attitudes of guilt and blame 
Holly Smith thinks that it is…  
 
“far less clear that that one can argue that prescriptions generated by Principle 2 appropriately 
support attitudes of blame, guilt and so forth. I myself see no reason why an agent should feel 
guilty (or blame others) for violating Principle 2, which is essentially a demand that one’s 
actions and intentions show a certain form of consistency. Inconsistency in not usually the 
object of blame and guilt” 64  
 
Our argument here goes something like this: If people in general did not follow morality that 
would be a disadvantage to all. If this is a disadvantage to all this will lead people in general 
to blame people that break the moral rules. And when you yourself perform an act that you 
know will result in people blaming you, you feel guilty. Is this argument any good? 
If it is true that it is rational to dispose oneself to keep agreements it is perhaps also 
rational to “wire” oneself in such a way as to be disposed to cooperate with others similarly 
disposed as well as disposing oneself to attempt to persuade others to adopt the cooperating 
disposition? “Wiring” oneself to persuading others could reasonably include attitudes of 
blame towards those who break the moral rules. Narveson writes:  
 
“There is another, and crucial, sense in which morality is general which in fact can be derived 
from the two aspects of overridingness and generality that have been brought out so far. This 
is the aspect of “enforcement”. Morality is (to be) enforced. Not in the sense in which the Law 
of the Land is enforced, with specially appointed enforcers, the “moral police”, but rather by 
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what I shall call “informal” means. Verbal means are pre-eminent among these: we shout at 
miscreants, we prod and natter and nag both ourselves and others.”65  
 
This view can be reinforced by the arguments found in Robert Sugden’s “The Economics of 
Rights, Cooperation and Welfare” where he argues that “conventions” often tend to become 
“norms”. He follows Hume in suggesting that “natural laws” can come to have moral force on 
us. He does not argue that we ought to behave according to “natural law” he argues only that 
we tend to believe that we ought to. And this is exactly what Holly Smith seems to doubt.  
Sugden argues that “conventions” are maintained not only by the interest each 
individual has in keeping to them but also by the expectations of other people. To make this 
clear let’s apply Sugden’s thinking to our apple-banana- example from above. Suppose you 
want me to perform some action X, say, give you my apple. You also have a confident 
expectation, based on your experience on other people’s behaviour in similar circumstances, 
that I will give you my apple. In the event I do something else, i.e. run away with your 
banana, leaving you worse off than you had expected to be. Then you would probably feel 
some resentment against me. And in order to explain this sense of resentment, Sugden 
suggests that it is enough that (1) you had expected me to do X (2) other people, in my 
situation, would have done X; (3) my not doing X has hurt you. In these circumstances 
resentment is a “primitive human response.” He continues: 
 
“It is another natural human response to feel uneasy about being the focus of another person’s 
resentment. Because of this, our actions – and our evaluations of our actions – are influenced 
by other people’s expectations of us.”66  
 
And further: 
 
“We expect that our dealings with other people will be regulated by convention, but this 
expectation is more than a judgement of fact: we feel entitled to expect others to follow 
conventions when they deal with us, and we recognize that they are entitled to expect the 
same of us. In other words, conventions are often also norms…”67 
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But why think that other peoples expectations matter? Especially why think that the 
expectations of strangers, that it is unlikely that we will ever meet again, matter? Sugden uses 
a real-life example to persuade us of this.68 Suppose you take a taxi ride. You reach your 
destination safely and you will probably never have any further dealings with this particular 
taxi-driver ever again. And even if you did he would be unlikely to remember you anyway. 
Why give him a tip? It is not in your interest to do so given these circumstances. Nevertheless 
people often do. And if they don’t tip they often experience “sensations of unease and guilt.” 
Sugden then suggests that the answer lies in the fact that we know that the taxi-driver wants 
us to tip him, we know that he expects us to tip him and we know that he knows that we know 
that he expects this.   
So it’s a matter of observation that we often are motivated by what we take to be other 
people’s expectations about us. And this even when those other people are total strangers, and 
when there seems to be “no solid reason” for us to care about their opinions of us.69 Further 
we also care about the opinions of third parties – “people with no direct interest in the game, 
but who happen to observe it, or who are told about it afterwards.”  70 And also when we 
ourselves are “bystanders”, witnesses to, but not ourselves involved in “games” we often react 
with resentment against those who breach established conventions. Again we can use our 
good-old example with the apple-banana- trade. Suppose you are not party to the trade but 
you happen to pass by and observe that one of the parties runs away with both fruits after 
having made a deal to trade. Even if we are not ourselves affected by the trade we have a 
tendency to blame such behaviour. 
Sugden draws the conclusion that other peoples expectations of us do matter. They 
matter because we care what other people think of us. Sugden also says that the “desire to 
keep the good will of others – not merely of our friends, but even of strangers” seems to be a 
“basic human desire” and further that this desire is presumably the product of biological 
evolution. We are social animals and Sugden says that some in-built tendency to 
accommodate oneself to others “must surely be an aid to survival for a social animal.” 71  
Earlier in this essay I argued against the ideas that the foundations of morals lie in 
our sympathetic feelings for each other or that they lay in a shared ideal of “sociability.” This 
may seem to clash with our present argument. It might seem that, in admitting that persons do 
come to take an interest in their fellows, we undermine the rationale for requiring that moral 
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constraints have a “non-tuistic” basis. But, as Gauthier says “…an affective capacity for 
morality does not give rise to moral constraints but presupposes their prior recognition; the 
desire to do one’s duty cannot determine the content of duty.”  72 And if moral constraints 
underlie “tuistic” values, then they must have a basis independent of those values. 
So we can therefore hold on to our rational, “non-tuistic” foundations of morality. 
We argue that persons come to take an interest in their fellows after they have recognized the 
rational basis for morality. They come to take an interest in participation because they 
recognize their mutual willingness not to take advantage of each other. Gauthier again “In 
accepting moral constraints they do not express their concern for each other, but rather they 
bring about the conditions that foster such concern.” 73 He continues: 
 
“A rational morality is contractarian. But this does not imply that it is of purely instrumental 
value to us. In relating morality to the provision of benefits that themselves involve no 
affective concern with others, we do not thereby impoverish the moral feelings of persons 
who have such concern. It is because we can give morality a rational basis that we can secure 
its affective hold” 74  
Answering the relevance objection 
In answering the relevance objection then, the contractarian first reminds us what morals is 
for. As we have pointed out above morals should be able to resolve conflicts of interest. If 
there is no conflict, there is no place for morality. If we look at Holly Smith’s example 
“consider a rule of etiquette requiring thank-you notes to be handwritten rather than typed” 
We agree with Smith’s intuition that this hardly seems to be a moral principle. But the reason 
it isn’t is that there is no real conflict to “solve” here. You cannot just pick any old principle 
you like and proclaim it a moral one, “Nor,” as Narveson says “despite the “internal” 
aspects of morals, can we derive the content of morality only by looking within our own soul. 
There are others to worry about.” 75 Morals is for the governance of everyone.  
I believe that we have shown, not only that contractarian moral principles are 
overriding, (sufficiently) categorical, and that they can support attitudes of guilt and blame, 
but we have also given these requirements independent support. That is, if moral principles 
did not have these mentioned features they would not perform the desired functions. 
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Is there anything left of the relevance objection? It is still possible to object that even 
though we have shown that there are rational, principles that are also overriding, 
(sufficiently) categorical, and that they can support attitudes of guilt and blame but that we 
still have not shown that these are moral principles. This, I believe, reduces the relevance 
objection to a mere verbal matter. But perhaps not, maybe we need to say something more. If 
there are any “moral” principles that differ from our conception of moral principles, that is, 
principles other than our rational-overriding-categorical-principles it is very unclear why 
anyone should accept these principles. In short, if we picture moral principles as something 
else than principles of rational choice we cannot give reasons that all rational persons must 
accept to follow these principles and hence we cannot answer the question of moral 
motivation. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that any plausible moral theory should be able to provide a good answer to the 
question “why should I be moral?” and that a rational-choice based theory such as David 
Gauthier’s contractarian moral theory provides a plausible answer to this question. Such an 
answer must take the form of a justification of morality. A justification that starts from 
premises that the “moral sceptic” must accept, and then shows that certain moral statements 
follow from those premises. This justification must be prudential since the premises are 
principles of individual instrumental rationality rather than factual statements about the world 
e.g. some “moral reality” or people’s intuitions. If these principles cannot be rejected and if 
moral principles follow from them, then morality will have been provided with a justification 
that even the fully rational moral sceptic must accept. And since we accept a conception of 
rationality that identifies rational-choice with individual utility-maximization the question 
“why be rational?” doesn’t makes any sense. If then, the “should” of moral principles are not 
very different from the “should” of other non-moral rational principles that would establish 
moral principles on a firm foundation. If on the other hand moral reasons would be of a 
wholly separate nature e.g. “non- natural” or “transcendental” then there would be no reason 
why a fully rational person could not ignore these reasons.  
I think that this is the way a rational justification of morality will have to take. A 
great theoretical advantage with this kind of justification that we have been advocating is that 
it doesn’t need to appeal to anything transcendental or metaphysical. Neither do we need to 
appeal to facts about people’s moral intuitions nor such particular psychological phenomena 
as sympathy or ideals of sociability. The only thing we need to appeal to is the most widely 
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accepted and most plausible conception of rationality, the one that identifies rational- choice 
with individual utility- maximization, where “utility” is the measure of individual preferences. 
This provides us with a rational justification of morality that even the “moral sceptic” must 
accept. 
 We have also tried to answer the powerful “relevance objection”, that says that even 
if there are rational principles for choice these are never moral principles. We have tried to 
answer this by sketching a theory of the nature of moral codes. We have argued that 
contractarian moral principles are overriding, (sufficiently) categorical, and that they can 
support attitudes of guilt and blame and we have provided independent support for these 
requirements. That is, if moral principles were not overriding they would not perform the 
functions we want them to. If moral principles would not be able to override individual self-
interest of one or the other of two conflicting parties it would not help us to solve the conflict. 
And if it did not that would render morality meaningless. 
If we have been successful in showing that there are rational principles that are also 
overriding, (sufficiently) categorical, and that they can support attitudes of guilt and blame, 
then we have “uncovered” the relevance objection and reduced it to a mere verbal matter. If 
there are any principles (epistemically true moral principles perhaps?) other than the kind of 
principles we have been picturing (rational-overriding-categorical-guilt/blame- supporting-
principles) it is very unclear why anyone should accept these other principles. 
These features of the theory (prudential justification, maximizing conception of 
rationality, instrumental conception of rationality, overridingness etc.) are crucial for our 
project in answering the important question of moral motivation. Rational- choice 
contractarianism is the only theory I know of that meet all of these criteria. 
